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DANIEL P. SULLIVAN*

"While we regrethaving to order a new trial before an already overburdened district
court, a new trial is mandated, and this case is a good illustration of the difficulties
inherent,generally,in the use ofluries to resolve patent disputes."'
- Judge Giles Sutherland Rich

INTRODUCTION
2
In 2002, Lucent Technologies sued Dell and Gateway for patent infringement.
Microsoft, in turn, filed a declaratory judgment of noninfringement against Lucent in
2003, and the cases were consolidated. 3 On February 22, 2007, a jury awarded
4
Alcatel-Lucent $1.52 billion in damages for MP3 patents that Microsoft infringed.
Although Microsoft licensed the technology in question from a German corporation
for $16 million, the verdict stands. 5 This marked the largest awarded verdict in a
6
patent trial ever.
With the recent trend of juries awarding "blockbuster verdicts," 7 it begs the
question:
do juries in patent infringement trials actually impede an alleged
infringer's right to a fair trial? If so, how can this unfairness be remedied?
This comment addresses why juries should - and how juries may - be removed
from the arena of patents. Section I explores the history and development of the
Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury, and how the two-prong historical test

* J.D. Candidate 2009, B.S. General Engineering, University of Illinois 2004. The author
would like to thank his family for their continual support, Michael Karson and Leah HeineckeKrumhus for their countless hours spent perfecting this comment, Elizabeth Al-Dajani for her
confidence and encouragement, and the board and editorial staff, past and present, of THE JOHN
MARSHALL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW for their collective insight and wisdom.
I Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
2 Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc. 470 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1182 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
aId.
Saul Hansell, MP3 Patents in UpheavalAfter Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, at C1.

Id.
See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828, 877-88 (D. Mass. 1985)
(establishing liability), affd, 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Polaroid received a judgment that
Kodak infringed its instant film development technology, receiving $909 million, the previous record
holder for largest awarded patent damages. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 76-1634,
1990 WL 324105, at *84 (D. Mass. Oct. 12, 1990) (assessing damages).
7 Sheri Qualters, IntellectualProperty Verdicts Exceed 1.3 Billion, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 26, 2007, at
S4; see e.g., z4 Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:06-CV-142, 2006 WL 2401099, at *26 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 18, 2006) (awarding z4 $140 million); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05CV264,
2006 WL 2037717, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 23, 2006) (awarding Finisar $78.9 million); Hynix
Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., No. C-00-20905, 2006 WL 2325276, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24,
2006) (awarding Hynix $306.9 million).
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has been applied to patent law. Section I also discusses limitations of patent juries
due to bias and due to the complex nature of legal-equitable hybrid claims. Section 11
analyzes whether or not the Seventh Amendment is a fundamental right and
examines how the courts have whittled away the right to a jury through complexity
exceptions and the Markman decision. Section III proposes the creation of an Article
I tribunal, giving these federal district patent courts original jurisdiction over patent
disputes. In addition, Section III advocates removing the jury right within these
tribunals and addresses the constitutionality of such a removal.

I. BACKGROUND

A. A BriefHistory of the Seventh Amendment
8
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in civil matters.
While the Framers all agreed on the importance of a civil jury, there was no
consensus as to the extent of this right. 9 The scope of a civil jury's power and the
standard of review for judges certainly varied in each of the thirteen states. 10 Four
major themes arose from the construction of the Seventh Amendment within the Bill
of Rights: a strong belief in the importance of civil jury trials, an assumption that
jury trials are not appropriate in all civil litigation, an inability to determine which
cases were (and were not) appropriate for juries to decide, and an attempt to avoid
this problem by creating purposefully vague language.1 1 While there is little
evidence to know what the Framers intended while drafting the Seventh
Amendment, the focus was not the Amendment's content, but whether or not to
include a civil jury amendment at all. 12 The Seventh Amendment was adopted to
assuage the paranoid minority that all personal liberties were safeguarded. 13

The Seventh Amendment was thus left to interpretation by the courts. One
early case interpreting the Seventh Amendment, in an opinion written by future
14
United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, is United States v. Wonson.
Justice Story indicated that some states had a statutory right of employing appellate

8 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.

Id.
9 Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil
Jury Trial,53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1008-10 (1992).
10 Id. at 1012.
11Id. at 1008.
12Edith Guild Henderson, The Backgroundof the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289,
291 (1966).
13 Id. at 292.
1428 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
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juries, but not a common law right. 15 Story therefore denied the right of a federal
appellate jury. 16 Although Justice Story strongly affirmed the right to a jury trial in
Parsons v. Bedford,17 Wonson demonstrates that the Seventh Amendment can be
18
interpreted to deny a right to a civil jury.
Justice Story also first affirmed the idea of remittitur, or a judicially mandated
reduction of damages, in Blunt v. Little.1 9 Justice Story, finding a $2,000 verdict
excessive, granted the defendant an option of having a new damages trial or
accepting a damages award of $500.20 Blunt sets perhaps an unintended precedent
that a judge can intervene when dissatisfied with a jury's conclusions, thus reducing
the role of a jury in a civil suit. The Supreme Court in Baltimore & CarolinaLine,
Inc. v. Redman 2 indicated that federal courts may take jury verdicts "subject to the
opinion of the court on a question of law" as well reverse a verdict in favor of a
plaintiff and enter in a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant.22
Justice Story's use of "common law" has been interpreted to mean English
common law in 1791 when the Seventh Amendment was adopted. 23 However,
Justice Story's Wonson decision has lead to interpretation difficulties because no
evidence exists to suggest that the drafters of the Seventh Amendment thought that
the term "common law" would refer exclusively to English common law. 24 Although
Story's concept of common law has survived, the common law right as applied to the
Seventh Amendment has been extended to common law action beyond the 1791
25
adoption.

B. The Rise of the PatentJury and the Two-Prong HistoriealTest
Prior to creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
jury trials in patent cases were rare. 26 Juries decided zero out of 125 patent suits in
1961 (0.0%), thirteen out of 382 patent suits from 1968 to 1970 (3.4%), and only two
out of 121 patent suits between June 1971 and June 1972 (1.7%).27 The Supreme
15 Id. at 748 (indicating that at least Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island had
conferred appellate juries statutorily, but that courts in equity in England recognized no such right
at common law).
16 Id. at 750 (stating that "an appeal in a common law suit from the district court removes
errors of law only for the consideration of this court; and that we are bound to deny a new trial of the
facts by a new jury").
17 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830).
18 Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 750-51.
193 F. Cas. 760, 762 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1,578).
20 Id.

295 U.S. 654 (1935).
Id. at 660-61.
23 See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
24 Klein, supranote 9, at 1031.
25 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192-93 (1974) (stating that Justice Story's "common law"
referred mostly to maritime and admiralty law, and that there existed a Seventh Amendment jury
right where legal rights were to be "ascertained and determined").
26 Ted D. Lee & Michelle Evans, The Charade:Trying a Patent Case to All "Three" Juries, 8
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 7 (1999) (noting that it was "an unusual occurrence" for early patent cases
to be tried before a jury).
27 Id. at 7-8.
21

22
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Court once acknowledged that most patent cases were tried by a judge and revealed
similar statistics: two out of 131 patent cases were decided by a jury in 1968 (1. 5 %),
eight of 132 patent cases were decided by a jury in 1969 (6.1%), and three of 119
trials were decided by a jury in 1970 (2.5%).28 However, after the creation of the
Federal Circuit and the development of uniform rules governing jury instructions
and interrogatories, the number of jury trials skyrocketed. 29 The "high-water mark"
occurred in 1994 when seventy percent of patent cases were tried by a jury. 30 With
the growing popularity of jury trials, damages awarded by juries increased
dramatically. 31 Between 1982 and 1992, the fifteenth largest patent damages jury
award was $19.8 million, while the largest jury verdict was $873 million.3 2 The
increasing use of juries in patent suits due to their lucrative verdicts begged the
question: is there an absolute right to a jury in a patent suit?
In order to determine whether or not a jury right existed, a court would look to
see whether that right existed at English common law in 1791, when the Seventh
Amendment was ratified. 33 In the arena of patents, the Federal Circuit clarified the
two-prong historical test (which examines the nature of the issues involved and the
nature of the remedy sought) in In re Lockwood.34 The Lockwood court, in reviewing
a declaratory judgment action, examined the nature of the issues and the nature of
the remedy sought. 35 The Federal Circuit concluded that there exists a jury right if
the remedy sought is legal, as opposed to equitable, in nature, and if there is an
"adjudication of legal rights" or an "implementation of legal remedies." 36
The United States Supreme Court furthered the Lockwood test in Markman v.
Westview Instrument. 37 When utilizing the two-prong historical test, the Court
first determines the character of the cause of action.3 8 The Court then determines
whether a particular issue is necessarily a jury issue. 39 This second question is
answered by "search[ing] the English common law for 'appropriate analogies' rather
40
than a 'precisely analogous common-law cause of action."'
28 Blonder-Tongue
29 Lee

Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 338 n.30 (1971).

& Evans, supranote 26, at 8.

30Id.
31 !d, at 9.

32Id.
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935).
3 50 F.3d 966, 971-72 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 515
U.S. 1182 (1995). The Federal Circuit subsequently noted that while the United States Supreme
Court inexplicably vacated Lockwood, the Federal Circuit still finds its reasoning "pertinent." Tegal
Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc. 257 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
'35Id.
at 972. This test for statutory actions involved two steps: (1) a comparison of the
statutory action to 18th-century actions in the courts of England, and (2) a determination of whether
the remedy is equitable or legal in nature. Id.
'36 Id.
37 517 U.S. 370, 376-77 (1996) [hereinafter Markman IAl.
38 Id. at 377
'3 Id.
40 Id. at 378 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1987)); see also Tegal Corp.
v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001). "A right to a jury attaches only to
cases more similar to those that were tried in courts of law." Id. (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 417). In
Toga], the plaintiff brought a patent infringement suit seeking both injunctive relief and damages.
Id. at 1338. The defendant raised affirmative defenses without asserting a counterclaim. Id.
However, the plaintiff dropped its damages suit, and the district court ordered that the trial would
33
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C Jury Bias in Patent Trials
The popular perception that there is a significant difference in a patentee's
success rate when juries decide patent claims is supported by statistical data taken
from 1983 to 1999.41 When juries decided patent suits, the patentee "win" rate
exceeded 68%,42 while when a judge adjudicated patent trials, the patentee "win"
rate was closer to 51%. 4 3 This demonstrates a statistically significant predictor of
44
which party will prevail based on who adjudicates the trial.

However, the empirical data also demonstrates that patentees have an
advantage over alleged infringers no matter who decides the issues of fact. 45 Overall,
when the data set was categorized by substantive issue, e.g., validity, enforceability,
infringement, willfulness, and damages, seven statistically significant trends
emerged:
[i]
[2]
[3]
[4]

patents are more likely to be held valid than invalid;
patents are more likely to be held enforceable than unenforceable;
patents are more likely to be held infringed than not infringed;
patents are more likely to be held willfully infringed than not
willfully infringed;
[5] patents are more likely than not to be held valid, enforceable,
infringed, and willfully infringed when adjudicated by a jury;
[6] patents are more likely than not to be held valid, enforceable, and
infringed when adjudicated by a judge; [and]
[7] either party has an equal chance of winning on the issue of
46
willfulness when adjudicated by a judge.
When multiple issues are decided at the district court level, the same party
tends to prevail in a sweeping, all-or-nothing fashion. 47
When validity and
infringement were both at issue, juries found for the same party on both issues 86%
of the time, but judges found for the same party 74% of the time. 48 With respect to
multiple claims, juries resolved all claims in favor of one party 87% of the time, while
judges resolved all claims in favor of one party 72% of the time. 49 Therefore, the
proceed without a jury. Id. The defendant took issue, raised the issue on the pleadings, and filed a
motion for reconsideration on the elimination of the jury. Id. The district court denied the motion,
and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at 1338, 1341.
41 Kimberly

A. Moore, Judges,Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empi±riealPeek Inside the Black

Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 386 (2000).
42 Id. at 387. The statistical analysis therefore rejects the null hypothesis that "when a jury
decides a patent claim, there is an equal chance of success for the patent holder and the infringer."

Id. at 386.
43 Id.
The statistical analysis therefore suggests that the null hypothesis, "when a judge
decides a patent claim, there is an equal chance of success for the patent holder and the infringer"
cannot be rejected. Id.
44 Id. at 387.
4, Id. at 391.
46 Id. at 390-91.
47Id.at 402-04.
48 Id. at 403.
49 Id. at 404.
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adjudicator is a statistically significant predictor of whether a party will prevail on
all issues in cases with multiple claims and multiple issues. 50 The data suggests that
judges are statistically more capable of resolving cases issue-by-issue instead of caseby-case.51
One of the few things that a potentially liable "infringer" can do to increase his
chances of prevailing is seek a declaratory judgment that the patent is not infringed;
when juries adjudicate patent claims, the party who filed the suit is a statistically
significant factor in who prevails. 52 There are three factors that contribute to the
advantage an infringer gains by filing the lawsuit: (1) the infringer may gain an
advantage by being able to choose the forum; (2) the infringer determines when the
lawsuit begins; and (3) the jury is less likely to be biased in favor of the patentee
because the patentee isnot bringing the lawsuit. 53 Regarding the third factor, that
juries are more sympathetic to a plaintiff, if an infringer files suit, the perception
54
that the patentee is a victim and the infringer is a villain is somewhat mitigated.
However, in a bench trial, filing a declaratory judgment plays no statistically
significant role in who prevails. 55 These statistical trends have legitimized popular
perceptions that juries are generally more sympathetic towards patentees, as
plaintiffs, but are much less so when alleged infringers, as plaintiffs, seek a
56
declaratory judgment of noninfringement.
While jurors' initial perceptions certainly pose a problem to defendant
corporations and other alleged infringers, combinations of complicated factual and
legal issues also pose difficulties for jurors, in spite of jurors' collective diligence in
attempting to understand such complexities. 57 Juries face two major issues in a
patent trial: (1) learning and comprehending complex scientific factual data and (2)
58
properly applying complicated and often confusing instructions on the law.
Combining juror bias with extremely complicated issues of law and fact raises issues
of jury competence. 59 Judges and practitioners doubt that juries can handle these
complex issues.6 0 The Federal Circuit has also voiced displeasure at remanding
cases that patent juries have mishandled.6 1 At least one United States Supreme

50 Id.

51Id.
52 Id.at 405.
53Id

Id.
,Id.
56 Id. at 407.
57Cynthia E. Kernick, The Trial, in

PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES HANDBOOK, 767,

787

(Barry L. Grossman & Gary M. Hoffman eds., 2005).
5S Id

59 See Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225, 228 (7th Cir. 1972). "The
task of giving error-free instructions in a patent case may indeed be extremely difficult." Id.
"Presumably this is only one of the many reasons why members of the Patent Bar have wisely
avoided jury trials in patent litigation." Id.at 228 n.9.
(30
Paul R. Michel & Michelle Rhyu, Improving PatentJury Trials, 6 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 89, 9091 (1996) ("Some suggest that jurors, mostly people of only average education and intelligence,
cannot properly decide complex cases, particularly technological disputes.").
(31E.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc. 725 F.2d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(reversing the district court's determination that the jury could have concluded that no damages
were proved).
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Court Justice has expressed similar sentiments. 62

D. Complications with Law andEquity
Without clear rules for specifically when a jury is allowed, the courts are left
with the task of determining whether - and to what extent - a Seventh Amendment
jury right exists as patent law and rules of procedure evolve. 63 Complications begin
to emerge when a plaintiff invokes both law and equity. A case involving both legal
and equitable principles is a hybrid case. These problems are exacerbated when a
plaintiffs claim and a defendant's counterclaim collectively create a hybrid case. A
hybrid case can also result when a plaintiff seeks one type of remedy (e.g., legal) and
the defendant seeks the other (e.g., equitable).

1. One Party'sCreation of a Hybrid Case
A court must look at both the nature of the claim asserted and the type of
remedy the plaintiff seeks. 64 There are four possible combinations of claims and
remedies a single party may raise: (1) legal claim and legal remedy, (2) legal claim
and equitable remedy, (3) equitable claim and legal remedy, and (4) equitable claim
and equitable remedy. 65 Of the four possible combinations of legal and equitable
claims and remedies, courts have consistently held that only the legal claim-legal
remedy combination is absolutely entitled to a jury. 66 A plaintiff may manipulate its
claim-remedy combination in order to either require or preclude the use of a jury.
Without asserting a counterclaim, the defendant may not affect the plaintiffs
election. For example, where a defendant raises affirmative defenses but does not
assert any counterclaims, the defendant is not entitled to a jury when a plaintiff has
67
elected to forego a jury by seeking only equitable relief.

(2Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 545 n.5 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Certainly there is
no consensus among commentators on the desirability of jury trials in civil actions generally.
Particularly where the issues in the case are complex ... much can be said for allowing the court
discretion to try the case itself.").
(33
See Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Right to July Trial in Patent Infringement Action in
FederalCourt, 18 A.L.R. FED. 690, § 2(b) (1974).
(34
Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
(5John E. Sanchez, Jury Trials in Hybrid and Non -HybridActions: The Equitable Clean-Up
Doctrine in the Guise of Inseparability and Other Analytical Problems, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 627,
648-49 (1989).
(36
See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.ll (1974) (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959) & Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-73 (1962));
Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 ([T]here is a right to jury trial on the legal claims which must not be infringed
either by trying the legal issues as incidental to the equitable ones or by a court trial of a common
issue existing between the claims."). In Curtis, the Court indicates the "obvious" right to a jury trial
on a legal claim. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196 n.ll. However, the Court also notes that a jury trial right
exists on the legal claim even if it shares common issues to an equitable claim. Id. ("The right
cannot be abridged by characterizing the legal claim as 'incidental' to the equitable relief sought.").
(37
See, e.g., Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1339; see also Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124
F.2d 563, 566 (2d. Cir. 1942). In BoaunitMis,the plaintiff-infringer sought a declaratory judgment
against the defendant-patentee's knitting patent. Id. at 564. The defendant counterclaimed,
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2. Two Parties'Claims and Counterclaims Creatinga Hybrid Case
68
Problems arise if there are both legal and equitable claims and counterclaims.
For example, if a plaintiff brings an equitable claim and a defendant brings a legal
counterclaim (or vice versa) it is entirely likely that factual disputes relate to both
the plaintiffs legal (equitable) and the defendant's equitable (legal) claims. 69 Trying
the equitable claim first without a jury may preclude a jury from fact finding on the
legal claim under res judicata or collateral estoppel. 70 Trying the legal claim first,
however, with a jury would result in juries making factual findings on the equitable

claim. 71

3. Two Parties'Remediesand Counter-Remedies Creatinga Hybrid Case
Further complications may develop if there are both legal and equitable
remedies sought by the parties. Such a situation could arise, for instance, when a
plaintiff seeks an equitable remedy, but the defendant, on his counterclaim, seeks a
legal remedy. The defendant would only be granted a right to a jury if he sought
legal remedies on his counterclaim. 7 2 Similar to hybrid cases, the trend has shifted
in favor of allowing juries to hear these cases despite the plaintiffs seeking an
73
equitable remedy.
Historically, patent courts specifically looked at several methods to determine
whether or not a jury right existed. 74 Today, the courts look primarily at the remedy

seeking a judgment that the patent be valid and infringed, injunctive relief and an accounting for
damages. Id. The court dismissed the defendant's counterclaim. Id. Then, the court "annulled" the
defendant's jury demand because, when the plaintiffs complaint was considered absent the
counterclaim, the case only involved equitable issues. Id. The court then determined that the
defendant's appeal was taken from an interlocutory, non appealable order and dismissed the appeal.
Id. at 564-65.
(38
Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1176, 1186 (1961) (discussing the
problems with the order of trial after Congress merged legal and equity jurisdiction in the federal
district courts).
(9Id.
70 d

71Id.
72See, e.g., Ryan Distrib. Corp. v. Caley, 51 F. Supp. 377, 380 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
Ryan
Distributing involved a plaintiffs seeking a declaratory judgment that defendant's patent was
invalid or not infringed. Id. at 378. The defendants counterclaimed, alleging that plaintiff was
indeed infringing and sought an accounting and damages. Id. The defendants also demanded a
jury. Id. The court found that but for the plaintiffs filing for declaratory judgment, an equitable
claim, the defendant-patentee could have sued seeking the requested legal relief, thereby preserving
its right to a jury. Id. at 379. The court held that the plaintiffs first filing should not change the
nature of the case and denied the plaintiffs motion to strike the defendant's jury demand. Id. at
380.
73Spivey, supra note 63, at § 5(c).
74See Markman 1, 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996) (citing Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295
U.S. 654, 657 (1935)). The Court indicated that they have attempted to make the distinction
between a jury and non-jury right based on a distinction between issues of substance versus issues
of procedure and based on issues of law versus issues of fact. Id. The Markman II Court found the
soundest course was to use the historical method by examining English common law. Id.
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being sought.7 5 For example, Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo ElectronAmerica, Inc. 76 held that
a defendant did not have a right to a jury because the plaintiff only sought equitable
relief and the defendant did not raise a counterclaim, let alone a counterclaim
seeking a legal remedy.77

E. SegregatingLaw for the Courtand Factfor the Jury
What is a question of fact for a jury versus what is a question of law for a court
is not always clear in patents.78 Very generally, however, utility, infringement,
willful infringement, and damages are fact issues that a jury may decide.7 9 In
contrast, however, obviousness and fraud on the United States Patent & Trademark
80
Office ("USPTO") have been held to be questions of law for the court.
When examining the history of the Seventh Amendment, there is no evidence to
suggest that the Framers gave a civil jury right much attention.8 1 While few juries
were initially seen in the patent arena, the last forty years have seen juries deciding
an increasing number of issues in patent trials. 82 This is problematic since juries are
statistically biased toward patentees and have difficulty understanding complex
scientific and legal issues. 83 The courts themselves are not always clear on what
84
issues juries decide in what situations, further complicating the role of the jury.

II. ANALYSIS
This section demonstrates the erosion of the right to a jury in patent trials. It
seeks to show that lack of incorporation through the Due Process Clause Fourteenth
Amendment indicates that the Seventh Amendment is not a fundamental right.
Furthermore this section demonstrates how complexity exceptions and the Markman
IIdecision further illustrate limitations of a jury trial right.

75 Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

76

Id. at 1331.

77 Id.
78 V.

at 1341.

Bryan Medlock, Jr., Jury Trials of Patent Cases, in PATENT LITIGATION 1990 487, 492
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 299, 1990),
available at WL, 299 PLI/Pat 487 (indicating that the federal circuit consistently rules that certain
claims are legal and certain claims are equitable).
97 See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (damages); SRI Int'l v.
Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en bane) (infringement); Raytheon Co.
v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (utility); Underwater Devices Inc. v. MorrisonKnudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds byIn re Seagate
Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (willful infringement).
80 See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(fraud on the USPTO); SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 375 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (obviousness).
81Klein, supranote 9, at 1008.
82 Lee & Evans, supranote 26, at 7-8.
83 Moore, supranote 41, at 365.
84 See Spivey, supra note 63, at § 2.
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A. The Seventh Amendment Right is Not Fundamental
It is helpful to examine the scope of the Seventh Amendment in order to
establish limited roles of juries. Application of the Seventh Amendment is narrow,
and its application to patent trials, and even civil litigation generally, illustrates that
85
the right is not a guarantee.
American jurisprudence defines a fundamental right as one that is "found to be
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"8 6 or one that is "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."87 Fundamental rights fall into two broad categories:
those that the Constitution expressly enumerated and those that the Supreme Court
conferred based on its interpretation of the Framers' intent.8 8 Explicit fundamental
rights protected by the Constitution, would be found, for example, in the First
Amendment: freedom of speech,8 9 freedom to exercise one's own religion, 90 and
freedom from imposed establishment of religion. 91 Others have been conferred
through Supreme Court precedent. 92 These include, but certainly are not limited to,

85 See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987) (holding that the Seventh Amendment
protects "only those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the essence
of the system of trial by jury").
86 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
87 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
88 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 795 (3d ed. 2006).
There exists a dispute between originalists and nonoriginalists in terms of how a fundamental right
is established. d. Originalists, for example, believe that fundamental rights are limited to those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution and that the courts overstep their bounds when they
recognize an implied right as fundamental. Id.
Nonoriginalists permit the courts to protect
fundamental rights that may not be enumerated specifically within the text of the Constitution, but
should be inferred from the general intent of the Framers. Id.
89U.S. CONST. amend. 1;N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (indicating that
the ability to criticize one's government and government officers is "the central meaning of the First
Amendment"); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(suggesting the metaphor of the Marketplace of Ideas).
90 U.S. CONST. amend. I; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (declaring the denial of
unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who quit a job that required her to work on
Sunday a violation of the Free Exercise Clause); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972)
(invalidating a law that required school attendance until age sixteen as violative of the Free
Exercise Clause as applied to Amish children because compulsory education after eighth grade ran
counter to firmly rooted Amish religious practices).
91 U.S. CONST. amend. I; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 316 (2000) (holding
that a public high school's policy of reciting prayer over the public announcement system before
varsity football games violated Establishment Clause).
92 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (indicating that certain rights are inherent
in the First Amendment).
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the right to privacy, 93 the right to marry, 94 and the right to raise one's children free
95
from interference.
The first clause of the Seventh Amendment states that "[iun suits at common
law ....the right of trial by jury shall be preserved... ,,96 The Seventh Amendment
does not actually confer the right to a jury trial - it merely preserves a right that
existed at English common law in 1791. 97 Moreover, the Seventh Amendment
applies only to the federal government, and not necessarily to states. 98 Additionally,
the Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated to apply against the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 99 Thus, the right to
a jury trial, though a part of the Bill of Rights, cannot be considered fundamental. 100
The second part of the Seventh Amendment, referred to as the Reexamination
Clause, states that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any

9 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (recognizing a right to private, consensual
sexual conduct by declaring sodomy laws unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey
505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (conferring the right of a
woman to be free from a per se government prohibition of abortions); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485
(protecting the right of married couples to purchase contraceptives).
91 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,12 (1967) (holding antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional by
reversing the convictions of an interracial married couple that Virginia claimed were illegally
married).
95Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (affirming a parent's right to make
decisions for their children by declaring a law forcing children to attend public schools
unconstitutional); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (recognizing family autonomy and
the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children by invalidating a state law that
barred the teaching of languages other than English in public schools).
9CU.S. CONST. amend. VII.
97Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (indicating that the aim of
the Seventh Amendment is primarily to "preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by
jury"); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935) (stating that one must look to the common law in
order to determine whether or not a jury right is appropriate).
98 See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916). In Bombolis, a
railroad employee was killed in the course of his employment, and his estate sued for negligence
under the federal Employers' Liability Act. Id. at 215. At trial, the jury failed to reach a unanimous
verdict after twelve hours. Id. at 216. However, pursuant to a Minnesota law, the court authorized
five-sixths of the jury to reach a verdict. Id. Although federal common law required a unanimous
jury verdict, the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment did not apply to the state
legislature even in the course of a federal action. Id. at 217.; see also Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 56 (1935) ("There is nothing... in the Constitution of the United States or
its Amendments that requires a State to maintain the line with which we are familiar between the
functions of the jury and those of the Court. It may do away with the jury altogether .. " (citing
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1876)).
99See Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877). '[A]rt. 7 of the amendments to the
Constitution of the United States relating to trials by jury applies only to the courts of the United
States .
I..."
-d.; see also, Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and the Separation of Powers: A
Venerable Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1436 (1998) ("The Seventh
Amendment, it appeared, ranked.., as least likely [among the Amendments in the Bill of Rights] to
be considered for absorption or incorporation by means of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
100See Brent E. Simmons, The Invincibility of Constitutional Error: The Rehnquist Courts
States' Rights Assault on FourteenthAmendment Protections ofIndividualRights, 11 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 259, 357 n.418 (2001) (noting that not all guarantees within the Bill of Rights are
essentially fundamental, specifically the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial).
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Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." 10 1 The
Reexamination Clause does not establish that juries are the exclusive finders of
fact. 102 If a jury is the finder of fact, only then will those facts not be reexamined on
appeal. 103
If a right to a jury trial is not fundamental, then a act of Congress removing the
jury option from an adjudicatory forum would receive only a minimum level of
scrutiny from a court addressing the act's constitutionality. 10 4 Under this level of
scrutiny, even if the Court disagrees with the legislation, it will still uphold the law
as constitutional, provided Congress had a rational basis for believing the act to meet
a legitimate end. 105

B. The Courts Have Limited Juriesin VariousAreas ofFact and Law that are Too
Complex
Courts have been able to whittle away a right to a jury trial because the right to
a civil jury trial is not fundamental and because the Reexamination Clause of the
Seventh Amendment does not guarantee that juries are the sole fact finders. This
section examines specific cases and how federal courts have further limited the civil
jury right.

1. Development of a Complexity Exception
Over the last thirty years, the courts have begun to invoke a complexity
exception, where a judge may remove a complex issue of law or fact from the jury and

101 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. But see Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 43233 (1996). "In keeping with the historic understanding, the Reexamination Clause does not inhibit
the authority of trial judges to grant new trials 'for any of the reasons for which new trials have
heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.'... That authority is
large." Id. (quoting the FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)).
102 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 460
(1977) ("The point is that the Seventh Amendment was never intended to establish the jury as the
exclusive mechanism for factfinding in civil cases."); Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on
Senteneing After Booker: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach the Sixth, 39 GA. L. REV. 895,
926 (2005).
103 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
104 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (holding that, under a
minimum level of scrutiny, the Court presumes the legislation to be constitutional based on the
assumption that the law "rests upon some rationalbasis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators" (emphasis added)).
105 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (refusing to strike
down an Oklahoma law distinguishing between optometrists and ophthalmologists merely because
the law, although wasteful and unnecessary, was out-of-step with the Court's own school of
thought). The Court, however, would more strictly scrutinize any law passed that targets a
fundamental right or a particular group of people. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 ("There may
be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.").
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decide the issue herself.1 06 This exception has generated much discussion and much
controversy over the last thirty years, polarizing constitutional scholars.1 0 7 This
section discusses how this area developed and how it is applicable in the patent
arena.

a. Katchen v. Landy
In Katchen v. Landy,108 the Supreme Court began to recognize that a right
existed in specialized courts to adjudicate jury issues without offending the Seventh
Amendment. 10 9 The issue in Katchen was procedural: whether or not a bankruptcy
court has jurisdiction to decide an issue of insolvency without a jury. 110 Petitioner
Katchen relied on Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover111 and Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 112 to preserve his jury right because he raised issues of both law and equity in
his claim. 113 The Supreme Court held that bankruptcy proceedings are inherently
equitable, and, therefore, the traditional Seventh Amendment right conferring a jury
114
only in legal matters was not violated.
What is exceptional about Katchen is not the equitable character of bankruptcy,
but rather how the Court distinguished Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen: "In
neither Beacon Theatres, nor Dairy Queen was there involved a specific statutory
scheme contemplating the prompt trial of a disputed claim without the intervention
of a jury." 115 The Court's distinction, although dicta, illustrates that a specific
statutory scheme may abridge a jury right in a civil trial. 116 Katchen recognizes the
uniqueness of bankruptcy courts under the Bankruptcy Act and thus allowed the
117
bankruptcy courts to operate undisturbed by a jury.

b. Ross v. Bernhard
Ross v. Bernhard118 is another case that questions the limitations of juries. In
Ross, the plaintiffs brought a derivative suit against the directors of their investment
106 Joseph A. Miron, Jr., Note, The Constitutionalityof a Complexity Exception to the Seventh
Amendment,73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865, 865 (1998).
107

Compare Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex

Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980), with James S. Campbell & Nicholas Le Poidevin,

Complex Cases: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U.PA.L.REV.965 (1980).
108 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
109 Id.at 329.
110 Id.at 325.

111
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
112

369 U.S. 469 (1962).

113

Katchen, 382 U.S. at 338; Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510-11 (stating that "only under

the most imperative circumstances ...can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through
prior determination of equitable claims"); Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 472-73.
11'
Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336-37.
115Id.at 339 (emphasis added).
116See id.
117
Id.at 326-27.
118

396 U.S. 531 (1970).
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corporation. 119 The Supreme Court held that the derivative nature of the suit was
equitable in character, and that the jury right was preserved since both legal and
120
equitable remedies were sought.
The Ross Court's method of analysis is exponentially more significant than the
particular facts of the case. The Ross Court, in dicta, expanded the traditional twoprong historical test - examining the common law according to pre-merger custom
and examining the nature of the remedy sought - and added a third prong: "the
practical abilities and limitations of juries." 12 1 The Court's language concedes that
juries are limited in their capacities to adjudicate difficult areas of law and of fact,
122
and that juries' limitations fall into line with 1791 English common law.

c. In Re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation
Although the Supreme Court, in Ross, toyed with a complexity exception, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In re Japanese Electronic
Products Antitrust Litigation,123 was the first court to hold a litigant may make a
showing that their case is too complex for a jury.1 24 That case involved complex
litigation claims and counterclaims alleging violations of several federal statutes,
including the 1916 Antidumping Act, the Sherman Act, the Wilson Tariff Act, the
Robinson-Patman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Lanham Act. 125 The Third Circuit
held that taking a complex case out of the jury's hands would not be a violation of the
Seventh Amendment. 126 Guided by the dictum of Ross, the court specifically weighed
the interests carried by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment against the
Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury, stating that "[t]he loss of the right to jury
trial in a suit found too complex for a jury does not implicate the same fundamental
concerns [as the potential loss of due process from having a jury adjudicate too
complex a case]." 127 Using the example of maritime and admiralty judicial systems,
the Third Circuit also indicated that courts are perfectly capable of reaching fair
decisions and that, in those contexts, the Seventh Amendment has never guaranteed
a right to a jury trial.1 28 "[T]he Supreme Court has consistently refused to rule that
the preservation of civil jury trial is an essential element of ordered liberty required
' 129
of the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."
While the
complexity exception invoked in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust

119Id.

at 531.
Id.at 542.
121 Id. at 538 n. 10.
122 Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practiceat the Time of the Seventh
120

Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 107. (1980) ("The practical abilities and limitations of juries
would have been a factor very much in the mind of a Chancellor in 1791.").
123 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
124 Id.at 1086.
125 Id. at 1072-73.
126 Id.at 1084.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1085.
129

Id.
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Litigation is not accepted in every circuit, 130 a complexity exception represents
another step away from the right of jury trials in complex litigation.

2. Markman and FurtherLimitationsof the CivilJury
The landmark Supreme Court case limiting the issues a jury may decide in a
patent trial is Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 131 Herbert Markman was the
owner of a reissue patent entitled, "Inventory Control and Reporting System for
Drycleaning Stores." 132 The patent essentially described a method to minimize
efficiency problems associated with the clothing dry cleaning process by using a
complex system of optical scanners and bar codes. 133 Markman sued Westview
Instruments, a company that sold specialty electronic devices, claiming that the
equipment sold infringed Markman's patent. 134
At trial, Markman presented testimony to a jury from several expert witnesses
(including himself) on the issue of whether Westview's equipment infringed his
patent based on the construction of the allegedly infringed claims. 135 After Markman
finished presenting his case, Westview moved for a directed verdict. 13 6 Although a
jury found that Westview infringed one of Markman's independent claims,
Westview's motion was eventually granted on the grounds that the courts and not
137
juries decide claim construction as a matter of law.
Markman appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which affirmed. 138 The Federal Circuit offered four justifications for its
decision: (1) a patent is a government grant, (2) the public should be afforded fair
notice and consistent construction of patent claims, (3) the patentee should be
afforded fair notice and final construction of her patent claims, and (4) patent claim
construction is analogous to statutory interpretation.,13 9 First, claim interpretation
as a matter of law allows a court to determine the scope of the governmentally
conferred right of a patent. 140 As an interpretation of a governmentally granted
right, a claim's construction should be treated as if it were originally part of the

130 See, e.g., In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431-32 (9th Cir. 1979).

A real estate

corporation's corporate failure brought on a litany of litigation ranging from criminal proceedings to
Securities & Exchange Commission proceedings to bankruptcy proceedings to private civil damage
actions. Id. at 413 n.1. In spite of the twenty separate suits joined into one single action, the Ninth
Circuit explicitly held that there is no express or implied complexity exception to the Seventh
Amendment jury trial right. Id. at 431-32.
131 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
132 Id. at 374; U.S. Patent No. Re. 33,054 (filed Aug. 28, 1987).
133 Markman I, 517 U.S. at 374.
134 Id. at 374-75.
135 Id. at 375.
136 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S.
370 (1996) [hereinafter Markman 1].
137

Id.

138 Id. at 989.
13) Id. at 978-79, 987. See also Scott A. Lund, Comment, PatentInfringement and the Role of
Judge and Juryin Light ofMarkman andHilton Davis, 21 J. CORP. L. 627, 637-38 (1996).
140 Markman 152 F.3d at 978.
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specification. 141 Second, claim interpretation by courts will provide consistent and
fair notice to other parties of the scope of a competitor's patent. 142
Claim
interpretation by courts will also promote consistent claim construction in the
public's eyes. 143 Third, having claim interpretation within the realm of the jury
would deter a patent owner from determining the "permanent and universal
definition of his rights under the patent.
... 144 Fourth, claim construction should
be treated similarly to statutory interpretation because patents can be more
145
predictably interpreted based on established canons of statutory construction.
Because statutory interpretation is strictly a matter of law, it follows that claim
construction should also be strictly a matter of law.
The Supreme Court began its review of Markman with the two-prong historical
test. 146 First, the Court addressed whether a particular issue at trial must fall to the
jury in order to "preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in
1791."147 By using this familiar language, the Court's analysis of the first prong was
consistent with the traditional analysis. 148 A traditional analysis would continue to
the second prong of this historical test to "determine whether [the remedy sought] is
legal or equitable in nature." 149 The Markman Court, however, altered the second
prong, asking "whether a particular issue occurring within a jury trial is itself
150
necessarily a jury issue."
Modifying the second prong shifted the Court's analysis. Ordinarily, the Court
would have separated legal issues from factual issues and allowed the jury to
determine the factual issues. 151 In Markman, even though claim construction was an
issue in a cause of action that claimed a jury trial right, claim construction was
viewed within a historical context to determine whether or not it must be heard by a
jury in order to preserve the substantive common law right. 152 The Court failed to
find analogous claim construction issues, which would guarantee a jury right, in its
review of precedent in historical context. 153 While claim construction is generally a
HI Id.
112

Id. at 979.

143 Id,
144 Id.
115

Id. at 987.

Markman 1$ 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996).
Id,
118 Id.
at 377 (stating that "there is no dispute that infringement cases today must be tried to a
jury, as their predecessors were more than two centuries ago"); see Tull v. United States, 481 U.S.
412, 417 (1987) ("[T]he Court must examine both the nature of the action and of the remedy sought.
First, we must compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of
England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity.").
119 Tu], 481 U.S. at 417-18.
150 Markman Ii, 517 U.S. at 376.
151 Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear.* The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh
Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 227 (2000). Justice Souter referred to the
act of "construing a term of art following a receipt of evidence" as a "mongrel practice." Markman If
517 U.S. at 378. By "mongrel," Souter likely means "mixed," referring to mixed areas of law and
fact, with the issues of law determined by the Court and those of fact determined by a jury. Moses,
supra, at 227.
152 Markman 1$, 517 U.S. at 377-80.
153 Id. at 379-80 (finding that "the mere smattering of patent cases the [the Court has] from
[the 18th-century] shows no established jury practice sufficient to support an argument by analogy
146
147
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matter of law, 154 factual disputes about the meaning of each claim have generally
been reserved for a jury. 155 Markman demonstrates a further limitation of the
importance of juries in patent trials.

C District CourtJudges Are HavingSimilar Difficulties
Eliminating juries from patent trials would leave judges deciding all issues of
fact and law. Markman made claim construction an issue of law for a judge instead
of an issue of fact for a jury. 156 However, increasing judicial reversal rates on the
issue of claim construction since Markman indicate that federal district judges may
be as ill-equipped to handle complicated patent issues as juries. 157 From April 23,
1996, the day the Supreme Court decided Markman, through 2003, the Federal
Circuit held that the lower court wrongly construed at least one term in 37.5% of the
cases, causing the Federal Circuit to vacate or reverse the lower court's judgment
29.7% of the time. 158 As an immediate effect of Markman, the Federal Circuit - by
its own statistics - reversed almost 40% of all claim constructions in 1997.159

Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit has voiced little confidence in district judges'
abilities to interpret claims correctly; he seems to question whether judges are any
better at construing claims than juries. 160 Judge Rader pointed out that, like juries,
judges have the same learning curve and the same reliance on experts when
attempting to understand new technologies. 161 Notably, the Federal Circuit, which is
ordinarily the only court to review claim constructions, has a significantly higher
reversal rate than other circuit courts of appeals. 162 While post-Markman reversal

that today's construction of a claim should be a guaranteed jury issue"). The Supreme Court's
Markman II decision is not novel in indicating that the fact finding role of the jury is limited. See
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 460 (1977). In

Atlas Roofing, employers petitioned for review of fines accrued for violating the Occupational Safety
and Health Act. Id. at 447. The Court held that Congress could assign an administrative agency
adjudication without a jury trial and not violate the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 455. Justice White
said, "[t]he point is that the Seventh Amendment was never intended to establish the jury as the
exclusive mechanism for factfinding in civil cases." Id. at 460.
154 See Markman , 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
155 See Moses, supra note 151, at 218. This is certainly true in other areas of substantive law,
such as contract law. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212(2) (1981) ('A question of
interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined by the trier of fact if it depends on the
credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from
extrinsic evidence.").
156 Markman Ii, 517 U.S. at 390; Markman , 52 F.3d at 978.
157 Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later:Is Claim ConstructionMore Predictable ,
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 239 (2005).
158 Id.
159 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 1474-76. "What is the distinction between a trial judge's understanding of the claims
and a trial judge's interpretation of the claims to the jury? Don't judges instruct the jury in
accordance with their understanding of the claims? In practice, how does this court's lofty appellate
logic work?" Id. 1474.
161 Id. at 1475.
102 See Cheryl Lee Johnson, The False Premise and Promises of Markman's Decision to Task
Judges with Claim Construction and the Judicial Scorecard, in HOW TO PREPARE & CONDUCT
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rates in the area of claim construction eclipse 50% in the Federal Circuit, reversal
rates of non-patent legal issues in other courts of appeals are less than 20%.163

III. PROPOSAL
Because there is such uncertainty in the outcome of patent cases, 164 it is time to
remove both lay juries and judges without a patent background from the patent
arena. This section proposes an establishment of an Article I tribunal to decide
issues of law, specifically claim construction.
"The Congress shall have Power ... To constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court" under the U.S. Constitution. 165 It is important to note that the
Constitution uses the language "tribunal" instead of "courts" as it does in Article
III,166 implying a distinction between the two bodies. 167 This distinction has long
been held extend Congress's powers by conferring jurisdiction to Congress to create a
court outside the realm of the judiciary. 168 Therefore, it follows that Congress may
169
create a tribunal that exercises its powers under the Patent and Copyright Clause,
and that Article III juries have a different "constitutional position" than
administrative agencies.170
While Congress may constitutionally create an
administrative tribunal, Congress may not statutorily strip parties of their Seventh
Amendment rights to a jury trial. 171
MARKMAN HEARINGS 2005, at 9, 64 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course
Handbook Series No.837, 2005), availableatWL, 837 PLI/Pat 9.
10;3Id,
161 Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1476 (Rader, J., dissenting) (stating that post-Markman, "the trial
court's early claim interpretation provides no early certainty at all, but only opens the bidding").
1CI5U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
166 Compare id. ("The Congress shall have Power... To constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court" (emphasis added)), with id. art. 11, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." (emphasis added)).
107 Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929).
[I]t long has been settled that Article III does not express the full authority of
Congress to create courts, and that other Articles invest Congress with powers in
the exertion of which it may create inferior courts and clothe them with functions
deemed essential or helpful in carrying those powers into execution.

Id.
168 See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 531-32 (1962); Exparte Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 449;
Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828).
169 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").

170 Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 1037, 1067 n.151 (1999). Administrative agencies are a discretionary creation of Congress,
while juries, in some circumstances, are constitutionally required. Id.
171Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51-52 (1989).
"On the common law side of the federal courts, the aid of juries is not only deemed
appropriate but is required by the Constitution itself." ... Congress may devise
novel causes of action involving public rights free from the strictures of the
Seventh Amendment if it assigns their adjudication to tribunals without statutory
authority to employ juries as factfinders. But it lacks the power to strip parties
contesting matters of private right of their constitutional right to a trial by jury.
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Within the realm of patents, one example of such a legislative tribunal is the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAr') - an administrative body run out
of the USPTO. 172 The primary role of BPAI is to hear appeals on whether or not an
application should be approved and an invention should be patented. 173 If the
applicant is still dissatisfied, she may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. 174

Because Congress has established the BPAI as a legislative tribunal deciding
issues of patentability, Congress can create a new body to hear other issues after the
patent has been granted. Indeed, the BPAI itself hears some post-grant patent
proceedings. 175 This comment proposes that Congress create a new administrative
tribunal ("Patent Tribunal") to hear those post-grant issues that are a matter of law namely claim construction. Furthermore, this Patent Tribunal could adjudicate
issues of fact in certain circumstances. 176 Administrative patent judges on the
Patent Tribunal would preside over all Markman hearings and adjudicate any other
potential legal issues that a jury ordinarily would not decide. In fact, the role of
these judges would be comparable to that of a federal hearing examiner. 177 The
operation of the Patent Tribunal generally would be subject to procedural
administrative law. 178 The effect of this Patent Tribunal would be to improve judicial
As we recognized in Atlas Roofing, to hold otherwise would be to permit Congress
to eviscerate the Seventh Amendment's guarantee by assigning to administrative
agencies or courts of equity all causes of action not grounded in state law, whether
they originate in a newly fashioned regulatory scheme or possess a long line of
common-law forebears ....
The Constitution nowhere grants Congress such
puissant authority. "[L]egal claims are not magically converted into equitable
issues by their presentation to a court of equity," ... nor can Congress conjure
away the Seventh Amendment by mandating that traditional legal claims be
brought there or taken to an administrative tribunal.
Id. (citations omitted).
172 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2006). When a patent application goes through the USPTO, an examiner
decides whether or not the invention is entitled to a patent. Id. § 131. If the patent is rejected, the
applicant can file for reexamination. Id. § 132(a). If the application is rejected a second time, the
applicant may appeal the second rejection to the BPAI. Id. § 134(a).
173 See id. § 134.
174

Id. § 141.

See id. § 134(b) (appeal of rejection during exparte reexamination of an issued patent); id. §
134(c) (appeal of rejection during interpartesreexamination of an issued patent).
176 For instance, if the case involved only equitable issues, the Patent Tribunal might be able to
adjudicate all issues in the case without offending the Seventh Amendment. See Tegal Corp. v.
Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Furthermore, the parties could
waive their Seventh Amendment rights, thus allowing the Patent Tribunal to try the entire case.
177 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978) (holding that federal hearing
examiners are performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency and are therefore entitled
to absolute immunity for damages caused by their judicial acts). "There can be little doubt that the
role of the modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge ... is 'functionally
comparable' to that of a judge. His powers are often, if not generally, comparable to those of a trial
judge." Id. at 513.
178 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (regulating rule making in an administrative agency);
Id. § 554 (regulating subject matter adjudicated); Id. § 556 (regulating powers and duties, burden of
proof, evidence and the record as a basis of decision in administrative hearings); Id. § 557
(regulating initial decisions, conclusiveness, review by an agency, submission by parties and
contents of decisions made by administrative judges); Id. § 3105 (providing for administrative law
judges to be assigned to Article I cases and proceedings).
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economy by removing Markman hearings from Article III federal district courts and
by decreasing reversal rates on claim construction because judges with patent
backgrounds would be construing these claims. This proposal is hardly a radical
concept given that Congress has attempted to create an administrative board to
handle some post grant proceedings in its most recent patent reform legislation. 179
A balancing test is used to determine whether adjudication in the Article I
Patent Tribunal impermissibly threatens the integrity of Article III courts.18 0 While
no factor is dispositive, a court will examine (1) "the extent to which the 'essential
attributes of judicial power' are reserved to Article III courts," (2) "the extent to
which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers
normally vested only in Article III courts," (3) "the origins and importance of the
right adjudicated, and" (4) "the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the
requirements of Article III." 181
This balancing test weighs in favor of adjudicating post-grant legal disputes in
the proposed Article I Patent Tribunal. With respect to the first two factors, because
patents are enumerated within Congress's Article I powers, its encroachment into
Article III powers of adjudication are minimal. 182 While a right to a civil jury trial is
important in general, the right has been erradicated in the context of claim
construction through Markman.1 83 Finally, Congress can justify creating a patent
tribunal by referencing jury bias, federal district judicial reversal rates and general
judicial inefficiency as a rational basis for removal.

CONCLUSION

The Framers of the United States Constitution never intended the Seventh
Amendment to create rigid, absolute rights. In fact, that the rights has never
explicitly been incorporated to apply to the states via the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment implies that the right to a jury trial in a civil matter is
certainly not a fundamental right. Moreover, the Markman decisions, as well as
others, have eroded the universe of issues that juries can decide.
The merger of law and equity combined with the creation of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has increased the presence of juries in
patent trials. Unfortunately, jury bias and the complicated issues of law and
technology involved in patent suits have brought into question a jury's capability to
fairly and accurately decide issues. At least one judge on the Federal Circuit has

179
Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 7 (2007) (proposing a Patent Trial and
Appeal Board and giving the Board the power to "conduct post-grant opposition proceedings").
180 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (stating that the
Court will not "adopt formalistic and unbending rules" when determining when a non-Article III
tribunal "impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch").
181 Id.
182 Markman 1752 F.3d 967, 978 (1995) ("When a court construes the claims of the patent, it 'is
as if the construction fixed by the court had been incorporated in the specification,' ... and in this
way the court is defining the federal legal rights created by the patent document." (quoting GEORGE
TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 452 (4th ed.

1873)).
183

Markman I, 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996).
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even questioned District Court judges' abilities to understand complex technology
84
and law, particularly in the area of claim construction. 1
Congress may create an Article I Patent Tribunal as long as that tribunal does
not strip a party of his jury right - one that Supreme Court jurisprudence has
diminished over time.
By creating a Patent Tribunal, composed of judges
experienced in patent law, Congress may mitigate the current issues today's juries
and judges cause in patent trials without offending the Seventh Amendment.

18' See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1474-76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J.,
dissenting).

